

Chapter 6¹

Pakistan, 2001–2011: Washington’s Small Stick

Clara H. Suong

Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far.

Theodore Roosevelt

U.S.-Pakistan cooperation in counterterrorism efforts from 2001 to 2011 highlights the success and failure in translating U.S. influence into effective indirect control of high-cost agents in proxy wars. After the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. government and the Pakistani military leadership made an implicit contract over Pakistan’s cooperation in counterterrorism efforts. However, the growing divergence in interests between principal and proxy, as well as the rising cost of effort induced the proxy to shirk and the principal to resort to direct action. Resurgence of the Afghan Taliban after 2004 and the U.S. policy shift to deter them exacerbated the conflict of interests between the United States and Pakistan. Growing domestic opposition to Pakistan’s cooperation with the United States also increased Pakistan’s cost of effort, leading to shirking by Pakistan. Consequently, the United States shifted to direct action using drone attacks.

The Pakistani case also highlights the importance of the scope conditions for effective control of proxies specified in the Introduction to this volume. Puzzlingly, we see little punishment of the Pakistani military leadership by the United States despite its lack of effort. Instead, the United States continued to reward Pakistan with aid and diplomatic concessions. This puzzling behavior by the United States toward Pakistan illustrates some constraints on the

¹ This chapter will appear in *Proxy Wars: Suppressing Violence through Local Agents*, edited by Eli Berman and David A. Lake, forthcoming from Cornell University Press in Spring 2019. It is posted here by permission of the publisher. All rights reserved.

principal. At times, the principal cannot use negative inducements in proxy wars not only because monitoring of the proxy is imperfect but also because punishment of the proxy is risky. For the United States, conditioning punishment on the level of Pakistani effort was difficult as the punishment, even when weak, could backfire and degrade the capability of both the agent and the principal to control disturbances. In fact, conditioning and suspending U.S. aid to Pakistan in 2009 and 2011 contributed to deterioration of the principal-proxy relationship: Pakistan's shut down ground supply lines to Afghanistan in 2011. The shutdown imposed large strategic and economic costs on the U.S. government and forced it to back down eventually.

The chapter proceeds as follows: The next section applies the predictions derived from the theory proposed in the Introduction to counterterrorism cooperation by the U.S. government and the Pakistani military leadership from 2001 to 2011. The chapter then probes details of the interactions between the principal and the proxy, which can be divided into three periods. From 2001 to 2004, the United States engaged in indirect control of disturbances, delegating suppression of al-Qaeda and Taliban militants to the Pakistani military leadership and rewarding it generously. From 2004 to 2007, the United States shifted from indirect to direct action against disturbances as Pakistan's cost of effort and shirking increased. From 2007 to 2011, the United States expanded its direct action and attempted to punish the Pakistani military leadership, to which it responded by retaliating against the United States. The chapter concludes by examining alternative explanations for the U.S. government's unbalanced use of rewards and punishments toward Pakistan.

<A>Theoretical Expectations

This chapter analyzes interactions between the principal, the United States, and its proxy, the Pakistani military leadership, in counterterrorism cooperation from 2001 to 2011. During this period, the disturbance to the United States was violence against U.S. citizens and forces in Afghanistan by al-Qaeda and Taliban militants and their affiliates, beginning with the 9/11 attacks. Many of the militants had been covertly supported by the Pakistani military, in particular the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence), the main intelligence branch of the Pakistan military, and had fled into Pakistan when the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan started. Throughout this period, the disturbance was considered extremely costly to the United States, causing deaths of many U.S. troops and citizens. The Pakistani military leadership was not as concerned about the disturbance as the United States. Yet it possessed a comparative advantage in suppressing the disturbance due to its proximity to and knowledge about the militants.

To deter violence by the extremists, the United States could take either direct action against them by conducting military operations in Pakistan or pursue indirect control by delegating to a proxy, the Pakistani military leadership, to suppress them. Specifically, the United States was left with two choices: conducting covert operations in Pakistani territory (direct action); or taking no direct action in Pakistan and fully delegating to the Pakistani military leadership (indirect control). The extremely high potential cost to the United States of overt military action in Pakistan ruled it out as an available and feasible option; only covert military operations were potentially feasible.¹

However, direct intervention against the militants with ties to Pakistan, even when covert, was not expected to be cheap for the United States. Expanding direct action to Pakistan was politically burdensome to a United States preoccupied with fighting wars within Afghanistan and Iraq, which were growing unpopular among the American public. Direct intervention, even in the

form of covert operations, was also not welcomed by Pakistan, adding to the U.S. cost of direct action.

Due to the high cost of direct intervention, indirect control was preferable for the United States in theory. Accordingly, the United States established an implicit contract with the Pakistani military leadership to deter al-Qaeda and Taliban militants in Pakistan immediately after the 9/11 attacks.² The Pakistani military was expected to halt its financial and military support for al-Qaeda and the Taliban, provide the United States with military, intelligence, and logistical support, and conduct counterterrorism operations against the militants.

However, the Pakistani military leadership was a high-cost agent throughout this period. Cooperation with the United States was highly unpopular among the military's rank-and-file, political allies and foes, and the Pakistani public, due to previous U.S. foreign policies, and Pakistan's domestic politics.³ Moreover, the increasing divergence in interests of the U.S. government and the Pakistani military leadership regarding the threat from the Afghan Taliban added to the latter's cost of effort, increasing the leadership's shirking behavior and making indirect control increasingly inefficient for the United States from 2004 onward. Prior to the Taliban's resurgence in 2004, the United States and the Pakistani military leadership had largely shared interests, prioritizing the proxy's role in suppressing al-Qaeda in Pakistan. After 2004, however, the United States prioritized countering the Taliban threat whereas Pakistan did not. For Pakistan, suppressing the Afghan Taliban implied reversing Pakistan's 30-year policy of using the same militants as their own proxies and loss of influence in Afghanistan. Moreover, the U.S. government's monitoring of the Pakistani military leadership's efforts was imperfect and delayed, impeding effective indirect control.

The high cost of the Pakistani military leadership eventually led the U.S. government to employ other means of controlling the disturbance: direct control through drone strikes. This is congruent with the theory's prediction that the high cost of the agent leads to the principal's direct control or inaction (H_1).

However, the theoretical prediction about the proxy and the principal with misaligned preferences diverges from the observational outcome. In theory, the United States was likely to motivate the Pakistani military leadership with high-powered incentives, such as large rewards and costly punishments, and Pakistan was likely to comply when interests of the two parties misaligned after 2004 (H_6). While the United States attempted to incentivize Pakistan with costly punishments, it could not fully implement its strategy of conditioning and withholding aid. In response, the Pakistani military did not comply after its preferences began to move away from American preferences in 2004.

The divergence between the prediction and the realized outcome stems from the two scope conditions for the theory: private information about the proxy's efforts; and the proxy's subordination. It was difficult for the United States to monitor Pakistan's "positive" efforts to counter the militants because it had a small footprint in Pakistan. It was also difficult to assess Pakistan's "negative" efforts in supporting the militants because they were covert. It was not until 2007 that the United States concluded that Pakistan was shirking.

This case's near failure to meet the theory's scope condition about the proxy's subordination is another reason. The Pakistani military leadership was not a proxy subordinate to the U.S. government but a peer-like ally. Pakistan had powerful leverage over the United States through its monopoly over cheap supply lines to Afghanistan. Thus, United States was constrained by the high cost of imposing negative inducements on the Pakistani military

leadership, including punishment or replacement of the incumbent leadership. Punishing Pakistan by stopping or conditioning aid thus was risky for the United States as this could have resulted in Pakistan's retaliatory closure of the supply lines.

In sum, agency theory predicted that the United States was likely to use indirect control before 2004 but direct action after 2004, due to the increase in Pakistan's cost of effort and divergence in interests between the two countries. The theory also predicted that the United States was likely to provide the Pakistani military leadership with large rewards and costly punishments when engaged in indirect control. Furthermore, the comparison between the theory's predictions and observational outcomes shows that the Pakistani military leadership is an example of a high-cost and peer-like proxy that nearly violates the theory's scope condition about the proxy's subordination. (Table 6.1).

[Table 6.1 About Here]

<A>Pakistan, 2001–2011

2001–2004: Establishment of the Proxy Relationship and Outward Cooperation by Pakistan

The U.S.-Pakistan relationship had been rocky prior to the 9/11 attacks. In the 1980s, Pakistan was considered an important ally because of its geographical proximity to Afghanistan. Pakistan became a key transit country through which the United States supplied arms to the Afghan resistance after the Soviet invasion and occupation. Consequently, Pakistan received a substantial amount of military aid from the United States.

In the 1990s, however, Pakistan's nuclear activities and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan prompted U.S. disengagement from the region. The United States stopped providing Pakistan with significant military aid around 1991. By 2001, the United States had imposed trade sanctions on Pakistan, including one for its nuclear test in 1998. Preoccupied by regions other than South Asia, the United States considered Pakistan as a troublesome ally at best. Figure 6.1 illustrates historical trends in U.S. aid to Pakistan, which reflect U.S. disengagement from Pakistan from 1991 to 2001.

[Figure 6.1 About Here]

The turbulent relationship was exacerbated by Pakistan's hawkish, security- and ideology-driven military regimes and the power they wielded. In Pakistan, democracy has long been overshadowed by the military, which perceives itself as the protector of Pakistan's security and its Muslim identity.⁴ Military regimes have ruled Pakistan longer than civilian regimes, which were noted for their inefficiency, and for being overly influenced by the military.⁵ The Pakistani army in particular has long dominated the country's foreign and military policy by either forcing its preferences on the civilian government or through the civilian government's fear of a coup.⁶

The 9/11 attacks dramatically changed the stagnant relationship between a wary United States and its troublesome ally into a major principal-agent relationship. Immediately after the attacks, the administration of George W. Bush realized that getting Pakistan to cooperate was vital in fighting terrorism and tracking down al-Qaeda and its affiliates. The administration swiftly established an agreement with the Pakistani military leadership headed by General Pervez

Musharraf, Pakistan's chief of Army staff from October 1998 to November 2007 and president from June 2001 to August 2008.

The implicit contract was accompanied by an explicit threat by the United States against the Pakistani military leader. On September 12, 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell called Musharraf and said "you are either with us or against us," which Musharraf interpreted as "a blatant ultimatum."⁷ The arrangement also included a list of explicit demands by the principal of the proxy. On September 13, 2001, U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Wendy Chamberlain presented a list, which included: 1) stopping al-Qaeda operatives at the Pakistani border and preventing all supply of weapons and logistical support to Osama bin Laden; 2) immediately providing the United States with intelligence on terrorists, and immigration and internal security information; 3) cutting off all fuel supplies to the Taliban and preventing its recruiting activities from within Pakistan; 4) breaking off diplomatic relations with the Taliban government in Afghanistan, and assisting in the destruction of bin Laden and his network; 5) providing access to Pakistani airspace to conduct military and intelligence operations; and 6) providing territorial access, including naval ports, air bases, and strategic locations in the border regions.⁸

Facing the Bush administration's firm post-9/11 stance, Musharraf initially seemed to have been eager to curry favor with the Americans. Responding to pressure by the Bush administration, Musharraf publicly pledged to cooperate with the United States. In televised speeches on September 19, 2001, and January 12, 2002, Musharraf condemned the 9/11 attacks and stated that Pakistan would help the United States with its counterterrorism campaign against bin Laden, al-Qaeda, and the Afghan Taliban with intelligence and information, access to the Pakistani airspace, and general logistical support. Capitalizing on the elites' concerns about Pakistan falling behind India in the geopolitical competition, he justified Pakistani cooperation

by emphasizing that India had offered access to all of its military facilities and full logistical support in order to enter into an alliance with the United States, and get Pakistan designated a terrorist state.⁹ U.S. officials generally accepted Musharraf's public commitment as legitimate; after the televised speech on January 12, 2002, Chamberlain reported to Powell that "Musharraf had delivered everything the Americans had on their wish list."¹⁰

Consistent with Musharraf's promise to the United States, the Pakistani military launched major campaigns against militants in the FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas), participating in the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom from 2001 to 2002 and conducting Operation Al Mizan from 2002 to 2006.¹¹ In Operation Enduring Freedom, the Pakistani military supported U.S. forces in capturing or killing members of the Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda. Units from Pakistan's regular army, Special Services Group, Frontier Corps, and the ISI were deployed to the border regions to target al-Qaeda and Taliban members.¹² In Operation Al Mizan, the Pakistani military launched a campaign to target non-Pakistani fighters in the FATA. Approximately 70,000–80,000 troops were deployed to the FATA and conducted around 50 operations against the extremists.¹³

The Pakistani military also arrested several high-profile al-Qaeda militants during this period. For instance, Pakistani authorities arrested Ibn al-Sheikh al-Libi, who ran an al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan, and turned him over to the U.S. government in November 2001.¹⁴ On March 28, 2002, Abu Zubaydah, al-Qaeda's head of military operations, was arrested near Lahore. On March 1, 2003, Pakistani forces captured Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, al-Qaeda's third in line and the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, in Rawalpindi.¹⁵

Musharraf's efforts were generously rewarded by the United States, which provided him with a steady flow of military and economic aid as well as significant debt relief. Establishment

of the proxy relationship in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks was followed by a spike in U.S. assistance to Pakistan (Figure 6.1). The package included financial assistance of nearly \$2 billion per year, reimbursements, and military and economic aid.¹⁶ In particular, the Coalition Support Funds program allowed Pakistan to be reimbursed by the United States for its expenditures on the “Global War on Terrorism.”¹⁷ The United States also obliged the Pakistani request for forgiveness of its \$3 billion debt in September 2001.¹⁸

Moreover, the Bush administration rewarded the Pakistani military regime by lifting nuclear- and coup-related trade and financial sanctions. On October 27, 2001, President Bush signed into law a bill to exempt Pakistan from sanctions under the condition that the president determine that aid to Pakistan “facilitates the transition to democratic rule in Pakistan” and “is important to United States efforts to respond to, deter, or prevent acts of international terrorism.”¹⁹ By 2004, Pakistan had established itself as a key non-NATO ally of the United States. In the Department of State’s *Country Reports on Terrorism 2004*, Pakistan was referred to as “one of the United States’ most important partners in the war on terrorism.”²⁰

However, the Pakistani military’s role in the fight against terrorism was limited. The Musharraf regime’s domestic alliance with the Muttahida Majlis Amal (United Action Front, MMA), a loose coalition of six Islamist parties, may have constrained it from pursuing militants too aggressively.²¹ Despite its inception as an anti-Musharraf coalition, the MMA made a deal with Musharraf after the 2002 national elections, which enabled Musharraf to win a vote of confidence and guaranteed his presidency through 2007. Historically, the Pakistani military has maintained a political alliance with Islamist parties (“the military-mullah alliance”); Musharraf had no intention of breaking that alliance.²²

The United States was also less ambitious in its request. The Bush administration allowed Pakistani forces to prioritize attacks on al-Qaeda and anti-Musharraf insurgents, the shared interest of the two countries.²³ According to Karl Eikenberry, former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, “until at least 2005, the Bush administration simply did not prioritize the Taliban’s Quetta sanctuary in its discussions with Pakistani officials. Al-Qaeda dominated U.S. attention. Pakistanis saw this as a green light to keep doing what they were doing with the Taliban.”²⁴

The Pakistani military’s unwillingness to control the border regions allowed the Afghan Taliban to relocate to Pakistan, sowing the seeds of future resurgence. By early 2002, the majority of hard-core Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders had fled Afghanistan and sought refuge in the autonomous FATA, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), and Baluchistan.²⁵ For instance, Mullah Mohammed Omar, the leader of the Afghan Taliban, settled in Quetta, Pakistan, in late 2002 and began reorganizing his fighters in Afghanistan, allegedly under protection of the ISI and the extremist political party Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, which controlled the provincial government.²⁶ Other members of the Taliban and al-Qaeda also moved war supplies to Pakistan, raised funds for military campaigns from Pakistan, and managed training camps in Pakistan.

The period from 2001 to 2004 represents a quid pro quo principal-proxy relationship between the United States and Pakistan. The Bush administration made explicit demands of the Pakistani military leadership for its cooperation in counterterrorism operations. In return, Pakistan was generously rewarded with aid and diplomatic concessions. That relationship was enabled by aligned interests of the two countries; both implicitly prioritized the threat from al-Qaeda over that from the Afghan Taliban.

2004–2007: A Rude Awakening, and Transition to Direct Action by the United States

Disturbances grew more frequent and costly to the United States from 2004 to 2007. After the initial retreat from Afghanistan, by 2004 the Afghan Taliban had regrouped and strengthened in Pakistan. In 2003, the Afghan Taliban began their military campaign in eastern Afghanistan and ended up controlling the Zabul province. The Taliban's resurgence intensified in 2004, with control of four provinces in southern Afghanistan. By 2007, the Taliban's sphere of influence included not only regions in southern and eastern Afghanistan but also the Ghazni province in central Afghanistan.²⁷

Yet suppressing the Afghan Taliban would have undermined Pakistan's development of "strategic depth" in Afghanistan.²⁸ Even before the inception of the Taliban regime, the Pakistani military had been an important supporter of the group, providing it with financial, military, and intelligence support in its takeover of Afghanistan in the 1990s.²⁹ The Pakistani military leadership's amicable relationship with the Afghan Taliban and its extremist affiliates had enhanced Pakistani influence over the neighboring country.³⁰ Countering the threat from the Afghan Taliban meant Pakistan's loss of that influence.

Moreover, the Musharraf regime faced increasing domestic costs of effort, due to the growing opposition to its policy of cooperating with the United States and India. The regime's continued cooperation with the United States caused internal opposition within the military in particular. Due to strong identification and shared ethnicity with the militants by rank-and-file Pakistani forces, many of them left their extremist Pashtun brothers unscathed and arrested only Arab militants. They also tended to arrest militants in cities but turned a blind eye in rural regions, including in the FATA and Baluchistan.³¹

Musharraf's cooperation with India also drew heavy criticism. Wary of India's growing influence in Afghan affairs and its cooperation with the United States, Musharraf urged the United States to help resolve the Kashmir dispute with India. In return, the United States and India demanded that Pakistan stop supporting militants fighting the Indian military in Kashmir. Subsequently, Musharraf ordered the military, and the ISI in particular, to stop pushing militants into Kashmir. However, this enraged the military and the public in Punjab province, where there was strong support for operations by India- and Kashmir-oriented militants, and drew criticism from the political opposition who called for reciprocation by India.³² Musharraf's policy of favoring India over the militants contributed to his growing unpopularity and coincided with the Pakistan-based terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba's bombing attacks in Mumbai in July 2006, which killed more than 200.³³

Musharraf's balancing act of catering to both domestic political interests and U.S. demands began to take its toll after 2004.³⁴ Domestically, his regime became increasingly unpopular; public approval of Musharraf plunged from 60 percent in June 2006 to 30 percent in November 2007 (Figure 6.2).³⁵

[Figure 6.2 About Here]

With Musharraf's popularity in free fall, the reformist Pakistan People's Party (PPP) on the rise, and the end of his presidential term approaching, Musharraf was preoccupied by domestic political turmoil. His dismissal of Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry in March 2007 induced street protests by lawyers, supported by the opposition and civil society groups. Feeling vulnerable, he began negotiations with Benazir Bhutto over her return to

Pakistan. After he passed the controversial National Reconciliation Ordinance to allow Bhutto to return to Pakistan, Musharraf was reelected president for another term, assisted by abstention from voting by Bhutto's PPP. Yet this was the beginning of the end, and he eventually stepped down as military leader in November 2007 and as president in 2008.

Domestically beleaguered, the Musharraf regime shirked from deterring the Afghan Taliban and Taliban-affiliated groups in Pakistan from 2004 to 2007. Instead, it was preoccupied with controlling domestic disturbances that posed a threat to the *Pakistani* regime but not to the United States. The regime concentrated on making political deals with anti-Pakistan militants in the FATA and KP regions, such as the Shakai Agreement in April 2004, the Srarogha Peace Agreement in February 2005, the Waziristan Accord in September 2006, and the Swat Agreement in May 2008.³⁶

However, U.S. officials were still willing to publicly give Musharraf the benefit of the doubt, attributing the lack of effort to his subordinates or the inherent difficulties of the task. For instance, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage said on October 1, 2003, that "I personally believe that President Musharraf is genuine when he assists [the U.S. government] in the tribal areas ... but I don't think that affection for working with [the U.S. government] extends up and down the rank and file of the Pakistani security community."³⁷ Michael Hayden, director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), praised Pakistan in January 2008, saying that the United States has "not had a better partner in the war on terrorism than the Pakistanis," and attributed the deteriorating situation to the inherent difficulties and complexities in fighting extremism.³⁸

Accordingly, the United States continued to reward Pakistan by providing aid despite the regime's delinquency. An analyst characterized the package as the following:

Senior administration officials considered the package more like a reward for wartime services Pakistan had already rendered than as a point of leverage for new negotiations. The administration chose to focus on what Pakistan had provided—from high-level arrests of al-Qaeda operatives to logistical support for the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan—and not on what Pakistan had failed to do, like taking a decisive stance against the Taliban fighters who fled from Afghan battlefields.³⁹

The United States also rewarded Pakistan diplomatically. In March 2006, President Bush visited Pakistan, the first presidential visit to Pakistan in six years. During the visit, Bush and Musharraf acknowledged the U.S.-Pakistan “strategic partnership” and called for a “strategic dialogue” and “significant expansion of bilateral economic ties.”⁴⁰ He also publicly praised Musharraf for his efforts in hunting down al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan and his long-term commitment to democracy.⁴¹

Additionally, the United States came to the defense of the Pakistani military against political attacks by the opposition. When Benazir Bhutto, a major political rival of Musharraf, was assassinated on December 27, 2007, in Rawalpindi, many Pakistanis initially accused the military of being behind the assassination.⁴² The United States publicly endorsed the Pakistani government’s claim; Hayden in a media interview in January 2008 blamed members of al-Qaeda and allies of Baitullah Mehsud, leader of the Pakistani Taliban, for the assassination, consistent with the Musharraf regime’s assertion.⁴³

Yet U.S. views of Pakistan were slowly changing behind closed doors, as the United States began to prioritize the threat of the Afghan Taliban. By 2007, the Bush administration had realized that the Taliban had regrouped in Pakistan and formed a violent insurgency in

Afghanistan with other groups.⁴⁴ The Bush administration also began to see the selective counterterrorism efforts by the Pakistani military, realizing that, while Pakistan cooperated with the United States in deterring al-Qaeda, it had continued to support Afghanistan-oriented militants, such the Taliban and the Haqqani network.⁴⁵ The more important fighting the Taliban insurgents became, the further apart the Bush administration and Pakistani military leaders grew.

Instead of imposing any punishment on Musharraf for non-compliance, however, the United States turned to direct action—launching drone strikes.⁴⁶ In 2004, the CIA started carrying out targeted killing by armed drones in Pakistan. On June 18, 2004, Nek Mohammed, a former Pakistani ally of the Taliban, was killed in a drone attack in South Waziristan. On May 14, 2005, another successful drone attack occurred in North Waziristan, killing Haitham al Yemeni, a high-ranking al-Qaeda weapons expert.⁴⁷ On December 3, 2005, Abu Hamza Rabia, a member of al-Qaeda, and four followers were killed by a drone strike in North Waziristan. Neither government acknowledged that drones launched these strikes nor admitted U.S. involvement in the killings.⁴⁸

While these attacks did not elicit any immediate public reaction, a later strike on January 13, 2006, resulted in civilian deaths, and protests broke out. That attack aimed to kill Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda's second-in-command, but missed, and killed 18 civilians, including five women and five children. Following the burial of the victims, approximately 8,000 Pashtuns marched in protest, and anti-American sentiment spread across the country.⁴⁹ On October 30, 2006, the CIA launched an attack on a madrassa in Chenagai in the Bajaur Tribal Agency, targeting Mullah Liaquatullah, a pro-al-Qaeda and pro-Taliban militant. The strike killed about 80 followers of his --believed to be in military training at the madrassa. Despite the Pakistani

government's reassurance that these madrassa students were in "no way innocent students," thousands of locals marched in protest, chanting anti-American and anti-Musharraf slogans.⁵⁰

From 2004 to 2007, interests of the United States and the Pakistani military leadership diverged. Despite the U.S. inducements and rewards to target the Afghan Taliban in Pakistani safe havens, the politically vulnerable Pakistani military leader was unwilling to exert suppressive effort that would further jeopardize his political survival. Instead of punishing him for non-compliance, the United States turned to direct action, resorting to drone strikes.

2007–2011: The Vicious Circle of Attempted Punishments and Strong Retaliations

From 2007 to 2011, extremist violence in Afghanistan continued, after militants settled in safe havens in Pakistan, resulting in increased fatalities among U.S. forces (Figure 6.3). Pakistani failure to deter the Afghan Taliban became increasingly costly as the Afghanistan war grew increasingly unpopular among the U.S. public. This put pressure on the Bush administration, and the new Obama administration to control the violence in Afghanistan more effectively.

[Figure 6.3 About Here]

To stabilize Afghanistan and to precipitate the eventual drawdown in the war, the Obama government launched several policy initiatives, including the massive counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan. Modeled on the 2006–2007 success in Iraq, the COIN campaign included a "surge" in the number of troops deployed to Afghanistan.⁵¹

The Obama administration determined that a further lack of Pakistani action against Afghan insurgent safe havens would endanger the COIN strategy in Afghanistan.⁵² In fact, the administration increasingly began to view Pakistan as a bigger problem than Afghanistan: the former harbored militant groups, failed to secure the border between the two countries, suffered from ineffective governance, and possessed nuclear weapons.⁵³

The importance of dealing with Pakistan's non-compliance also coincided with the fall of Musharraf in 2007, ushering in Ashfaq Parvez Kayani as the new chief of Army staff. It also brought into power a civilian government under Asif Ali Zardari, the late Benazir Bhutto's husband, who was elected president in September 2008. Yet the U.S. government saw Kayani, not the civilian government, as their proxy in counterterrorism efforts.⁵⁴ A former director of the ISI and confidant of Musharraf, Kayani led the Pakistani army from November 2007 to November 2013.

To induce cooperation of the new military leadership, the Obama administration continued to reward Pakistan with aid and launched new cooperative initiatives, such as border coordination meetings, combined trilateral planning among Americans, Pakistanis, and Afghans, and coordinated operations on either side of the Pakistan–Afghanistan border.⁵⁵ However, Pakistan remained unwilling to take action against the Afghan Taliban.

Four categories of Islamist militant groups with ties to Pakistan were active in the area during this post-Musharraf period: 1) Pakistan-oriented militants who targeted the Pakistani military and government, such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (the Pakistani Taliban); 2) globally-oriented militants, including al-Qaeda and its Uzbek affiliates, operating out of the FATA and in Karachi; 3) Afghanistan-oriented militants, including the Afghan Taliban insurgency led by Mullah Omar and operating from Quetta in the Baluchistan province and

Karachi, the Haqqani network led by Jalaluddin and Sirajuddin Haqqani in the North Waziristan and Kurram Tribal Agencies of the FATA, and the Hizb-I Islami operating from the Bajaur Tribal Agency; and 4) India- and Kashmir-oriented militants, including the Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and Harakat-ul-Mujahadeen, based in the Punjab province and the Pakistani part of Kashmir.⁵⁶

Fundamentally, the United States and the Pakistani military leadership had diverging interests and priorities in dealing with these groups. Both opposed Pakistan-oriented militants, the Pakistani Taliban in particular, who carried out attacks mostly on Pakistani soil and were a threat to the Pakistani government.⁵⁷ Both parties also opposed the anti-American, globally oriented militants, such as al-Qaeda, but these were a significantly lower priority for Pakistan as most of those militant's attacks took place in Afghanistan (Table 6.2).

[Table 6.2 About Here]

The divergent interests of the United States and Pakistan were most evident in the case of Afghanistan-oriented groups, such as the Afghan Taliban, Haqqani network, and Hizb-I-Islami. Pakistani leaders saw U.S. presence in Afghanistan as temporary and viewed the Karzai regime skeptically.⁵⁸ To them, sustaining the relationship with Afghanistan-oriented militants was crucial to maintaining Pakistan's influence over Afghanistan in the long run.⁵⁹

In particular, the ISI was instrumental in organizing Pakistani support of Afghanistan-oriented groups under the cover of plausible deniability. Reportedly, the "S" Directorate of the ISI was responsible for Pakistan's covert proxy operations that included programs for the Afghan Taliban.⁶⁰ Headquartered in Rawalpindi, the "S" Directorate employed retired officers from the

Pakistani army and special forces, who worked as the handlers of the Taliban, coordinated Pakistani support for Taliban offensives, and provided fuel, ammunition, and logistical support.⁶¹

In contrast to the U.S. focus on the Afghan Taliban after 2004, the Pakistani military's emphasis was on anti-regime militants. Many of Pakistan's former protégés began targeting the Pakistani military and government to protest its partnership with the United States.⁶² In 2007, these militants eventually united as the Pakistan Taliban, led by Baitullah Mehsud.⁶³ The group began to attack Pakistani government officials and installations as well as civilians.⁶⁴ In response, the Pakistani military struck back with counterterrorism operations by the Pakistani military, paramilitary, and police forces, which resulted in a significant increase in the number of casualties and arrests of non-state combatants (Figure 6.4a).

[Figure 6.4 About Here]

The Pakistani military's belated counterterrorism efforts were responding to a domestic political calculus rather than incentives by the United States. Counterterrorism operations against anti-Pakistan militants were strongly supported by the Pakistani public. Yet the Pakistani public remained skeptical of the Pakistani military's cooperation with the United States and critical of U.S. drone strikes throughout this period (Figure 6.4b).

Initially, it was not easy for the United States to monitor Pakistani efforts to deter militants due to its small footprint in Pakistan. Monitoring the connection or lack thereof between the ISI and the Taliban was difficult as the ISI's role in supporting the Taliban was "designed to be deniable."⁶⁵ It was not until 2007 that the CIA began to monitor the links between the ISI and the Taliban.⁶⁶

However, the United States was able to indirectly monitor Pakistani forces' lack of effort by inferring it from the level of disturbances, as predicted by the theory in the Introduction. Figure 6.5 reports the U.S. State Department assessment of Pakistan's counterterrorism efforts between 2001 and 2011.⁶⁷ The tone of the reports' sections on Pakistani efforts was less negative from 2001 to 2005. However, scores dropped significantly in the 2006 report (published in 2007) and remained low afterwards, reflecting growing U.S. frustration with the Pakistani efforts.

[Figure 6.5 About Here]

Consistent with the 2006 drop in assessed Pakistani counterterrorism efforts, the United States began to question the effectiveness of aid to Pakistan in 2007 and 2008.⁶⁸ To incentivize Pakistan's military leadership, the United States attempted to punish it by conditioning aid. The punishments resulted in a strong backlash, forcing the United States to back down.

For instance, the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act backfired, jeopardizing the fragile relationship between the two countries. The act, passed by Congress in October 2009, tripled non-military aid to Pakistan for a five-year period but came with strings attached, specifying additional conditions for military aid. The law required the Secretary of State to certify that the Pakistani government had "demonstrated a sustained commitment to and [was] making significant efforts towards combating terrorist groups" and that the Pakistani military was "not materially and substantially subverting the political and judicial processes of Pakistan."⁶⁹ The Secretary of State was also obligated to submit routine reports to Congress on the Pakistani civilian government's control of the military.⁷⁰

Pakistani military leaders considered the act intrusive and were especially upset about the requirement for reports on civilian control over the military.⁷¹ U.S. policymakers in the executive branch had been wary of the legislation from the beginning, concerned that such measures of Pakistan's counterterrorism performance might "impede the effectiveness of [U.S.] assistance or play to the 'trust deficit' that plagues [the] bilateral relationship and promotes distrust among the Pakistani people," according to U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke.⁷² Consequently, a blanket certification for Pakistan was issued by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in March 2011, followed by the Obama administration's waiver of the certification requirements up to 2015.⁷³

With the growing divergence in interests and ineffectiveness of inducements, the United States increasingly relied on direct action against the extremist threat. In July 2008, the Bush administration launched Special Forces raids against Afghan Taliban camps in the FATA without prior consent from the Pakistani military.⁷⁴ The Obama administration subsequently increased the frequency of drone strikes in the FATA, launching 38 strikes in 2008, 54 in 2009, 128 in 2010, and 75 in 2011.⁷⁵

The tension between the principal and the proxy exploded with the discovery of, and subsequent attack on Osama bin Laden. The dramatic event demonstrated the Pakistani military's inability or unwillingness to track down America's most wanted terrorist and the Obama administration's willingness to take direct action. On May 2, 2011, U.S. Navy SEALs successfully conducted a night raid to kill Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, home of the prestigious Pakistan Military Academy. U.S. officials suspected that the Pakistani military, the ISI, or some of its members knew about bin Laden yet hid the information from the United States.⁷⁶ Subsequently, the Obama administration announced in July 2011 that they were

withholding \$800 million in military aid as Congress openly debated whether to decrease or condition aid to Pakistan.⁷⁷

Direct action by the United States against al-Qaeda or the Afghan Taliban, by publicly encroaching upon Pakistani territory, had been an anathema to the Pakistani military leadership. Accordingly, the operation against Osama bin Laden resulted in political embarrassment for the regime; the military leadership was heavily criticized for lacking capability or willingness to prevent the violation of sovereignty by the United States.⁷⁸

Still, direct intervention by the United States was limited, in that it usually involved covert operations. The Pakistani military leadership's tacit approval, if any, of such tactics was never publicized for fear of backlash by the already anti-American Pakistani opposition and public. Plans to expand direct action were often not implemented for the same reason. In 2009, President Obama considered conducting drone strikes beyond the FATA, including in Baluchistan province where senior members of the Afghan Taliban were believed to live. The plan was eventually dropped due to the fear of a backlash as "most of Pakistan [...] perceived a difference between the remote 'tribal areas' where strikes had so far taken place and the 'settled areas' where new strikes were being contemplated."⁷⁹

Fundamentally, the United States was constrained from imposing substantial punishment on Pakistan due to its reliance on Pakistan for cheap and convenient access to Afghanistan. Pakistan offered the most cost-effective route to provide war supplies to U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan. The forces had two main ways into landlocked Afghanistan: air, road, and rail routes via the Northern Distribution Network through multiple former Soviet republics, including Russia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan; or land or air routes via the Southern Distribution Network through Pakistan.⁸⁰

The Pakistani ground routes (Ground Lines of Communications) were shorter, more direct, and cheaper than any other option. On the Pakistani land routes, “[g]oods were offloaded at the Karachi port and then transferred onto thousands of privately owned local transport trucks for the trip into Afghanistan, either through the pass at Chaman (in Baluchistan) or through Torkham (in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa).”⁸¹ In contrast, the northern ground routes, while cheaper than the air routes, required long trips by land and cooperation from multiple countries, including Russia. The northern routes used Latvia, Estonia, or Lithuania on the Baltic Sea or Georgia on the Black Sea as initial landing spots.⁸² On the Baltic route, supplies were transported by truck and train through Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan before reaching Afghanistan.⁸³ On the Georgian route, they were carried through Georgia, Azerbaijan, and, after a trip across the Caspian Sea, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan before reaching Afghanistan.⁸⁴ Due to the costs of the northern routes, 90 percent of non-military supplies to U.S. forces in Afghanistan arrived via the Pakistani routes, according to a 2009 estimate.⁸⁵ Moreover, the U.S. military’s 2009–2010 surge in Afghanistan required a substantial increase in the logistic need to transport troops in and out.

The importance of Pakistani ground supply lines to the United States was demonstrated when the Pakistani government closed them in November 2011. The closure was allegedly prompted by a friendly fire incident on November 26, 2011, in which 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed by U.S. and NATO air strikes on two Pakistani military checkpoints at Salala. Investigations by the United States and NATO concluded that their forces did not knowingly attack the Pakistani checkpoints. The United States expressed “deepest condolences” but did not apologize.⁸⁶ Rejecting the findings, the Pakistani parliament ordered closure of the supply routes and declared that they would be opened only after the United States apologized for the attack.⁸⁷

The United States and NATO were not without options. Beginning in 2009, U.S. and NATO military forces began to diversify their portfolio of transit routes, shifting supplies from the Pakistani routes to the northern routes. By 2011, the U.S. military had shifted as much as 40 percent of its overall logistics supply to the Northern Distribution Network. By mid-2010, more than half of NATO's total supplies had been rerouted to it as well.⁸⁸ However, only "non-lethal" supplies were allowed on the Northern Distribution Network in accordance with agreements with the Central Asian transit countries.⁸⁹

Avoiding the supply routes through Pakistan ended up being very expensive. By January 2012, rerouting supplies to alternative routes was "costing [the United States] \$104 million a month, a huge increase over the pre-closure monthly cost of \$17 million," according to the Department of Defense.⁹⁰ The impending drawdown of forces in Afghanistan aggravated the situation, driving up U.S. and NATO logistics needs by as much as 200–300 percent.⁹¹

After lengthy negotiations, during which Pakistan demanded that the United States pay transit fees (reportedly \$5,000 per truck), Pakistan reopened the supply routes in July 2012 after Secretary of State Clinton issued a formal apology for the Salala attack. The United States also agreed to continue its reimbursements to Pakistan as part of the Coalition Support Funds program, which had been halted with the closure of supply lines.⁹²

The period between 2007 and 2011 is marked by the growing interest divergence between the United States and the Pakistani military leadership, by U.S. attempts to punish Pakistan, and by Pakistani retaliation. The United States wanted Pakistan to deter Afghan Taliban leaders based in the Pakistani border regions, but Pakistan was "unwilling to sever ties with" the Afghan Taliban and its affiliates.⁹³ Yet the U.S. effort to rein in the Pakistani military leaders by conditioning and suspending aid was rendered ineffective by their strong opposition,

forcing the United States to rely on unilateral action. Moreover, retaliation against the United States by Pakistan proved costly; when Pakistan closed the supply lines to Afghanistan in 2011, U.S. and NATO forces were forced to use more expensive routes to Afghanistan. This period revealed the constraints on the U.S. ability to punish Pakistan, due to Pakistani leverage.

<A>Conclusion

The principal-proxy relationship between the United States and the Pakistani military leadership in counterterrorism efforts from 2001 to 2011 represents the difficulty of a principal incentivizing a proxy with high cost of effort. Faced with violence by militants with ties to Pakistan, the United States engaged in indirect control, designating the Pakistani military leadership as its proxy. The Pakistani military initially exerted some effort in suppressing the militants, earning them financial and political rewards from the United States. However, as the major relocation of the Taliban to Pakistani tribal areas and domestic opposition in Pakistan made cooperation with the United States costly, the regime shirked in its efforts as a proxy. As the theory predicts, the United States transitioned from indirect to direct action against disturbances, launching drone attacks to target militants in Pakistan.

The case also showcases a constraint on the principal in utilizing an ally as a proxy, captured by the scope conditions specified in the theory in the Introduction. The United States was unable to use rewards and punishments of its proxy effectively, due to its reliance on Pakistan for access to Afghanistan, which increased with U.S. force size in Afghanistan. Pakistan possessed increasing leverage over the United States, and a willingness to use it. The United

States was unable to impose punishment on the Pakistani military leadership; when it attempted to do so, Pakistan promptly retaliated by closing down the supply routes to Afghanistan.

An alternative explanation for the lack of punishment by the United States is that the Pakistani military leadership was willing to deter the Taliban insurgents but was simply incapable of doing so. It is possible that the Pakistani military had some limitations in controlling militants in the border regions, given the porous borders and weak governance in the region.⁹⁴

However, most scholars and analysts attribute the Pakistan military's lack of effort more to its unwillingness to suppress the militants, driven by its ambition to use them as proxies against Afghanistan and India, than its inability to deter them.⁹⁵ Experts have noted the military's extremely high capacity, in professionalism and cohesiveness.⁹⁶ Furthermore, the Pakistani military showed from 2007 to 2011 that it had the military capacity to suppress anti-Pakistan militants in the short run when it had the political will to do so.

Some may also attribute the lack of punishment by the United States to the ignorance of U.S. officials. This may have been true in the early stage of the proxy relationship when "American officials failed to recognize the huge investment in time, money, and military effort that Pakistan had put into the Taliban from 1994 to 2001."⁹⁷ In fact, the theory captures this inherent difficulty for the principal in monitoring the proxy's level of effort and the proxy's informational advantage over the principal about its own cost of effort. For the United States, monitoring was especially difficult since Pakistan's "negative" effort—supporting militants—was largely covert and designed to be plausibly deniable by its leadership.

Yet ignorance alone does not explain the lack of punishment. Even after the United States recognized the Pakistani military's duplicity, it refrained from applying punishment. A more

plausible explanation is that the United States was constrained from punishing Pakistan because of the high cost.

Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons is another possible explanation for the lack of U.S. punishment against the Pakistani military leadership during this period. It is true that the United States was somewhat concerned about a collapse of the Pakistani regime and the consequential possibility of "loose nukes" ending up in the hands of terrorists, as evidenced by policy discussions among Obama administration officials.⁹⁸

However, it is unlikely that a fear of Pakistani regime collapse explains the lack of punishment. This alternative explanation requires that punishment in the form of a decrease or halt of U.S. aid to Pakistan in and of itself would have resulted in the collapse of the regime. However, it is farfetched to say that decreasing, conditioning, or cutting U.S. aid to Pakistan alone would have driven the regime out of power. Even if it did, it should have been the Pakistani military regime, not the U.S. government, which was more concerned about its own political survival; after all, a collapse could have resulted in the leader's exile, as in the case of Musharraf, or imprisonment, as in the case of Nawaz Sharif. Thus, it is the former that would have been more motivated to prevent this from happening, making it highly unlikely that the possibility of regime collapse could be used as leverage by the Pakistani military leadership over the United States.⁹⁹

Moreover, it was not only the United States but also the Pakistani military leadership that wanted the latter to have firm control of its nuclear weapons. Pakistan had been proactive in increasing the security of its nuclear arsenal. The Pakistani military leadership had strengthened export control rules, enhanced personnel security, and participated in international nuclear security cooperation programs since the 2004 revelations of a procurement network led by A.Q.

Khan.¹⁰⁰ The ability of the Pakistani military to control and secure Pakistan's nuclear weapons was publicly reaffirmed by U.S. officials, including Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen in 2008, U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Richard Olson in 2015, and Defense Intelligence Agency Director Vincent Stewart in 2016.¹⁰¹ A former administration official wrote to the Congressional Research Service in September 2014 in an email that:

The likelihood [of] terrorists obtaining nuclear weapons or nuclear material from Pakistani facilities is currently very low because of the extraordinary measures the Pakistan government and military have taken over the last decade... Pakistani nuclear materials do not pose the concerns that they once did.¹⁰²

The U.S.-Pakistan dynamics from 2001 to 2011 discussed in this chapter continue to affect the relationship of the two countries. To the United States, Pakistan remains a difficult and unreliable proxy, which has forced the United States to take direct action against disturbances. Under the Obama administration, direct U.S. action against the Taliban and their affiliates continued in the form of drone strikes. The number of U.S. strikes significantly decreased after debates about their legitimacy emerged and intensified following a 2015 operation that accidentally killed American and Italian hostages in Pakistan. Yet drone strikes in Pakistan remain central to U.S. policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan and, more broadly, the U.S. fight against terrorism, as demonstrated by the successful attack on Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansour, the leader of the Afghan Taliban, in May 2016.

Recent events also highlight the intransience and reluctance of Pakistan to be a reliable American proxy. In January 2018, the Department of State announced that the administration of

Donald J. Trump was “suspending security assistance” to Pakistan, estimated to be at least 900 million U.S. dollars, “until the Pakistani Government takes decisive action against groups, including the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani Network.”¹⁰³ While the move was applauded by some lawmakers who were frustrated by Pakistan’s “double game,” there remain concerns about Pakistan’s possible retaliation against the United States by shutting down its ground and air supply routes to Afghanistan.¹⁰⁴

It remains to be seen whether and for how long the United States can sustain its hardline stance against Pakistan and whether this will result in any change in Pakistan’s behavior. If history repeats itself, the policy may induce Pakistan to retaliate against the United States to score political points among the anti-American public ahead of the upcoming elections; and the United States may be again forced to pay the high cost of supplying the U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan through alternative routes.

Notes

¹ Actions by the principal and the proxy often exist on a spectrum and differ by case, so operationalization of the theory requires a careful consideration of the model in the context of each case. The model of Padro i Miquel and Yared (2012) assumes that direct control is feasible for the principal. The model in the Introduction differs, assuming only that (more limited) direct action is a feasible alternative if indirect control is ineffective.

² Musharraf 2006, 20; Shah 2014, 189.

³ Markey 2013.

⁴ Fair 2014, 201; Shah 2014.

⁵ In Pakistan's history, civilian governments have often been cut short by coups, notably by General Ayub Khan in 1958, General Zia-ul-Haq in 1977, and General Musharraf in 1999. Only from 1988 to 1999 were civilian governments voted into power, rendering the military less visible on the political scene but still powerful in the background. During this period, Benazir Bhutto, leader of the Pakistan People's Party, and Nawaz Sharif, leader of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, each served as prime minister.

⁶ Fair 2014.

⁷ Musharraf 2006, 20; Shah 2014, 189.

⁸ Musharraf 2006, 20; Shah 2014, 189. Musharraf states in his autobiography that he refused to give blanket permission for territorial access for military operations but, instead, granted limited access to two military bases only for logistics. Musharraf 2006, 20.

⁹ Rashid 2008; Ahmed 2013.

¹⁰ Rashid 2008, 146.

¹¹ Fair and Jones 2009.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Al-Libi was the first source of detailed information about the terrorists who carried out the 9/11 attacks (Fair and Jones 2009).

¹⁵ Rashid 2008.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ This program was later criticized for being too favorable to Pakistan with little oversight. Fair and Watson 2015.

¹⁸ Rashid 2008.

¹⁹ Shah 2014, 356.

²⁰ U.S. Department of State 2004, 74.

²¹ Jalal 2014.

²² Rashid 2008, 149.

²³ Fair and Jones 2009.

²⁴ Quoted in Markey 2013, 127.

²⁵ Rashid 2008; Gall 2014.

²⁶ Rashid 2008. In July 2015, the Taliban announced the death of Mullah Mohammed Omar and the succession by Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour. Mullah Mansour was killed by U.S. drone strikes in May 2016.

²⁷ Rashid 2008.

²⁸ Fair 2014.

²⁹ Gall 2014.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Rashid 2008; Fair and Jones 2009.

³² Markey 2013.

³³ Fair 2014.

³⁴ Gall 2014.

³⁵ Wike 2007.

³⁶ Rashid 2008; Fair and Jones 2009; Khattak 2012; Markey 2013; Shah 2014.

³⁷ Rashid 2008.

³⁸ Warrick 2008.

³⁹ Markey 2013.

⁴⁰ Kronstadt 2006, 1.

⁴¹ President Bush's visit to Pakistan was overshadowed by his earlier stop in India, where he announced an agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation between the United States and India (Kronstadt 2006).

⁴² Gall 2014.

⁴³ Warrick 2008.

⁴⁴ Fair and Watson 2015.

⁴⁵ Markey 2013.

⁴⁶ It is estimated that the CIA carried out a single attack in 2004, three in 2005, two in 2006, and five in 2007, according to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism (Ross and Serle 2014); data on drone attacks and casualties have also been collected by the New America Foundation (Johnston and Sarbahi 2016).

⁴⁷ Williams 2010.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 20.

⁵¹ White House 2009.

⁵² Dale 2012, 15.

⁵³ Sanger 2012; Markey 2013.

⁵⁴ Fair and Watson 2015.

⁵⁵ Dale 2012, 15.

⁵⁶ Shapiro and Fair 2010. Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, Musharraf told U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Wendy Chamberlain that while Pakistan would assist in capturing al-Qaeda operatives who fled to Pakistan, India- and Kashmir-oriented groups would be not be targeted in Pakistani counterterrorism efforts (Riedel 2012, 66; Gall 2014, 62).

⁵⁷ However, there is anecdotal evidence that the Pakistani Taliban was sometimes “another proxy force that the ISI tolerated and used for its own purposes, for leverage against Afghanistan or India, to keep some kind of order over the thousands of militants in the tribal areas, and even to use against its own people” (Gall 2014, 180).

⁵⁸ Markey 2013; Gall 2014.

⁵⁹ Fair 2014.

⁶⁰ Gall 2014.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² See Figure 3c for the rise in the number of terrorist attacks in Pakistan.

⁶³ Fair 2012. Baitullah Mehsud was killed by a drone attack in August 2009.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Gall 2014, 159.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Sentiment scores assess the positive or negative valence of documents. The sentiment analysis here was done via a dictionary method, using a pre-determined list of English words rated for valence with integer values between -5 and +5. The lower the score, the more negative words the document contains. The analysis used the AFINN dictionary (Nielsen 2011).

⁶⁸ Fair and Jones 2009, 162.

⁶⁹ Ibid, 141.

⁷⁰ Markey 2013.

⁷¹ Epstein and Kronstadt 2013; Markey 2013.

⁷² Holbrooke 2009, 10.

⁷³ Epstein and Kronstadt 2013.

⁷⁴ Markey 2013.

⁷⁵ Ross and Serle 2014. In July 2016, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence released counts of combatant and non-combatant deaths from “counterterrorism airstrikes,” most of which are considered to be drone strikes. The government estimated that 473 strikes had been conducted “against terrorist targets outside areas of active hostilities,” namely in Pakistan, Libya, Somalia, and Yemen, resulting in 2,372–2,581 combatant deaths and 64–116 non-combatant deaths, according to Savage and Shane 2016.

⁷⁶ Gall 2014.

⁷⁷ Fair 2012; Kronstadt 2015.

⁷⁸ Rollins 2011.

⁷⁹ Markey 2013, 159.

⁸⁰ Anwar 2013.

-
- ⁸¹ Fair and Watson 2015, 2.
- ⁸² Baldauf 2011; Anwar 2013.
- ⁸³ Ibid.
- ⁸⁴ Ibid.
- ⁸⁵ Baldauf 2011.
- ⁸⁶ Masood and Schmitt 2011; CNN Wire Staff 2012.
- ⁸⁷ Gregory 2012.
- ⁸⁸ Baldauf 2011; Kronstadt 2012.
- ⁸⁹ Kronstadt 2012, 33.
- ⁹⁰ ABC News Radio 2012; Muñoz 2012.
- ⁹¹ Baldauf 2011; Markey 2013.
- ⁹² CNN Wire Staff 2012; Muñoz 2012.
- ⁹³ Markey 2013, 163.
- ⁹⁴ Markey 2013.
- ⁹⁵ Ibid.; Fair 2014; Gall 2014.
- ⁹⁶ Shah 2014.
- ⁹⁷ Gall 2014, 54.
- ⁹⁸ Sanger 2012.
- ⁹⁹ Kerr and Nikitin. 2016
- ¹⁰⁰ Ibid.
- ¹⁰¹ Ibid, 17–18.
- ¹⁰² Ibid, 18.
- ¹⁰³ Department of State 2018; Reuters 2018.

¹⁰⁴ Fair 2018; Reuters 2018.




Figure 6.1




Figure 6.2




Figure 6.3





Figure 6.4




Figure 6.5